ABSTRACT Cascading outages can have a catastrophic impact on power systems. One such recent incident was the September 8, 2011 blackout that affected San Diego and large parts of the southwestern United States.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
ASCADING outages can have a catastrophic impact on power system operation and planning. Accordingly, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) transmission planning (TPL) standards requires utilities to plan for n-1-1 outages [1] . To comply with the NERC TPL standards, utilities must ensure that the system is able to maintain stability and operate within acceptable limits following such outages. An n-k contingency analysis involves studying the impact of simultaneous outage of k components on the system voltages and line flows [2] , [3] . For an n-1-1 contingency analysis, the two contingencies are applied sequentially rather than simultaneously. System adjustments if needed are made after the first outage, prior to applying the second outage [2] . Due to the possible system adjustments that can be made, the order in which the n-1-1 contingencies occur can be consequential. System adjustments can include [2]:
1. change in VAr output of generators; 2. adjustments in the settings of tap changer (ULTC), switchable voltage devices (SVD) and phase adjusting transformers (PAR); and 3. corrective measures like remedial action schemes (RAS), transmission switching and special protection schemes (SPS).
Ensuring the safe and reliable operation of a power system requires assessing both the static and the dynamic security for every n-1-1 contingency [4] , [5] . Although such assessments improve the overall reliability of a system, it comes with an additional burden of evaluating a vast number of outages. The number of n-1-1 contingencies can be overwhelming, even for a small power system. For a system with n elements, the number of possible n-1-1 contingencies is given by number of n-1-1 contingencies = n(n − 1).
Due to the large number of possible n-1-1 outages, a systematic approach to screen n-1-1 contingencies is needed. It is important to identify the contingencies that are critical from a system security viewpoint in a computationally efficient manner. The critical contingencies can be consequential, and need to be identified and analyzed prior to the non-critical cases. To achieve the stated objective this paper proposes:
1. a method to screen and rank n-1-1 contingencies for static security assessment (SSA), and 2. a method to screen and classify n-1-1 contingencies for dynamic security assessment (DSA).
The goal of the paper is to develop screening methods, which are convenient to implement in practice, at the same time being highly accurate in detecting critical contingencies. The proposed methods are intended to be used during the operations planning phase. In the following section, some of the existing contingency analysis methods are discussed and the need for a new approach is highlighted.
II. REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY SCREENING METHODS
For n-1 SSA, performance indices (PIs) based methods have been widely adopted [6] - [8] . These methods use a first order estimate of the post-contingency PI value, to measure the severity of a contingency. Contingency screening methods, which use partial or approximate network solutions to identify voltage and flow violations have also been proposed [9] - [11] . However, these methods can grossly underestimate the severity of a contingency [12] . This is due to the approximations involved and the highly nonlinear impact of the contingencies on the system voltages and line flows [12] . In recent times, with the advancement in computational capability, performing a complete ac power flow for large systems has become computationally feasible. Analyzing all contingencies, using ac power flow solutions is far more reliable. The availability of parallel computing infrastructures further eases this process. Hence, many commercially available power system analysis packages use ac power flow solutions as a tool to perform n-1 contingency analysis [13] .
For n-1 DSA, it is important to identify contingencies that may jeopardize the stability of the system before conducting a complete time-domain simulation (TDS) analysis. Various contingency screening methods for DSA have been proposed in literature. References [14] - [18] describe contingency screening methods based on the transient energy function. Filtering of contingencies using sparse transient energy function is described in [16] and [17] . Extensions of static security analysis techniques coupled with applications of artificial neural networks have also been explored for contingency screening and ranking [19] . A coherencybased index for contingency screening is described in [20] . Composite indices based on coherency, transient energy conversion and dot products have been proposed for contingency screening [21] . Most of these screening methods compute the required indices by performing short duration TDS only for a few cycles after the disturbance.
For n-1-1 SSA, performing an ac power flow for all possible n-1-1 contingencies is computationally prohibitive. The discussed n-1 contingency screening methods are inadequate due to their dependence on first order estimates and localized nature of analysis. Similarly, for n-1-1 DSA, screening n-1-1 contingencies using the traditional screening methods can also be impractical. This is due to the sheer number of short duration TDS that need to be performed. Therefore, there is a need to develop methods, which can perform n-1-1 contingency analysis in a computationally tractable manner.
The proposed techniques are used to perform contingency analysis for a utility in the WECC system. The following sections present detailed descriptions of the proposed methods and the results of the study.
III. CONTINGENCY SCREENING AND RANKING FOR SSA
AC power flow solutions capture the effect of an outage on system voltages and line flows better than dc power flows. This is particularly significant while analyzing n-1-1 outages. Therefore, an ac power flow based method is proposed here to develop a reliable n-1-1 contingency screening and ranking method. Reference [22] describes a method for multiple element contingency screening using line outage distribution factors (LODF). The method proposed here uses a similar idea. However, instead of LODFs, it relies on the corresponding ac quantities for the first n-1 outages to screen critical n-1-1 outages.
A. CONTINGENCY SCREENING FOR n-1-1 ANALYSIS
In an interconnected power system, the outage of a single component only affects a few branch flows and generator outputs. The majority of branch flows and generator outputs throughout the system remain practically unchanged. Substantial changes in branch flows or generator outputs following an outage indicate that the affected branches and/or generators compensate for the disconnected component. Therefore, to account for critical n-1-1 contingencies, candidate branches or generators for the second outage can be screened by analyzing their pre-contingent and postcontingent state (flows for branches and outputs for generators) following the first outage. To generate a list of n-1-1 branch-branch contingencies, the following steps are as follows.
1. Perform a full ac power-flow for all n-1 contingencies, followed by the system adjustments if any. Store all the branch MVA flows. 2. For each branch outage, compute the percentages of the MVA flow in the outaged branch that appears in all other branches in the system. This percentage is the ac equivalent of the LODF and is referred to as ACLODF in the rest of this paper. As an example, the ACLODF for a hypothetical line A for outage of line B is computed as follows: 3. All branches that have an ACLODF more than a set threshold for an n-1 contingency are screened as candidate branches for the second outage following that particular n-1 contingency. 4. For every candidate branch screened in step 3, the MVA flow on that branch due to a combination of any two n-1 outage is estimated. The change in flow is linearly approximated by using the already computed ACLODFs. 5. The n-1-1 contingency list is updated to include all pairs of the n-1 outage and the corresponding screened second outages in step 3. Steps 2 to 4 are performed for all n-1 contingencies. 6. The contingency list is updated to include any combination of two n-1 contingencies, which may cause the estimated flow on a screened branch computed in step 5, to be above a set percentage of the emergency rating of the branch. 7. Finally, all duplicate n-1-1 contingencies are removed from the list and the final list of n-1-1 contingency is formed. Steps 1 to 7 described here are used to generate the n-1-1 contingency list for branch-branch contingencies. An identical process is used to generate the n-1-1 contingency list for generator-branch and generator-generator contingencies. Instead of the ACLODF, the change in the branch MVA flows can be used as a criterion to screen generatorbranch contingencies. Similarly, the change in the reactive power output of generators can be used as a criterion to screen generator-generator contingencies.
Step 3 to step 6 is the core of the proposed method and is elaborated here. The ACLODF captures the MVA flow changes in the system in comparison to the MVA flow on the disconnected line. This helps to identify the branches that compensate for the disconnected branch, and hence important for system operation after the first outage. Lines with higher ACLODF have a higher influence on the connectivity of the transmission system and indicate the lower impedance paths to the loads. For branch-branch outages, if the outage of a single branch causes the ACLODF for another branch to be significantly high, it indicates that this second branch is an important supply route (lower impedance path) to the same load area. An outage of a branch with a high ACLODF can lead to considerable weakening of the transmission path to the load area. The alternate transmission paths to the load, which have a lower ACLODF, typically have substantially higher impedance. This can lead to large voltage drops and possible reactive power problems at the load buses. These lines may also be overloaded due to the excess power being routed through them. Close to large generation sources, disconnecting a branch with a high ACLODF can cause significant reduction in the short circuit ratio, leading to voltage regulation problems. Hence, the outage of such a branch may be critical following the corresponding n-1 branch outage. Furthermore, if two separate n-1 branch outages cause the estimated MVA flow on a branch or branches to increase beyond its emergency rating, the sequential combination of the two n-1 outages can also be critical. Steps 3 to 6 of the algorithm screen n-1-1 branch-branch outages based on these ideas.
Step 3 was found to be particularly significant in identifying n-1-1 contingencies that resulted in overloading of transformers and lines, which were operating near their emergency ratings in the base case. Similar justifications can be provided for generator-branch and generator-generator contingency screening process. Although not all screened contingencies may be harmful, the screening process substantially reduces the total number of n-1-1 contingencies that needs to be evaluated in details (by ac power flow). The remaining non-critical contingencies, if needed, can be evaluated by faster approximate methods like a dc power flow.
B. RANKING OF SCREENED n-1-1 CONTINGENCIES
After the screened n-1-1 contingency list is prepared, the screened contingencies are analyzed by performing ac power flows. Based on the power flow results, the contingencies can be ranked according to their impact on the system. Ranking contingencies based on their severity enables a planner or an operator to identify the most critical elements in a power system. Additional measures can then be taken for hardening such elements to prevent such outages. Among the various indices proposed in the literature [6] - [8] , the voltage-based index PI V and the flow-based index PI MW as defined [6] are used in this paper. The indices are as follows:
The weighting factors w bi and w li can be chosen by an operator or a planner based on experience, to assign higher weights to critical buses or lines in the system. The parameter α is set to 1 as given in [6] .
C. THE n-1-1 CONTINGENCY SCREENING AND THE RANKING PROCESS
The screening and ranking process described in the preceding subsections are combined to perform the n-1-1 analysis. Fig. 1 provides a flow chart of the complete n-1-1 contingency analysis method.
D. n-1-1 CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR STATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT
For testing the n-1-1 contingency screening and ranking method, a power flow case representing the WECC system was used. Contingency screening and ranking was performed for a selected utility's service area within the WECC system. The power flow case used is an actual representation of a large interconnected power system with 20605 buses, 17056 lines, 7836 transformers and 2737 generators. For n-1 and n-1-1 contingency analysis, elements at all voltage levels above 100 kV were considered. Including all transmission lines, transformers and generators within the selected utility's service area, the n-1 contingency list comprises of 403 outage events. For the n-1-1 analysis, all remedial actions after the n-1 contingencies were limited to adjustments in voltage control devices (SVD and ULTC), power control devices (phase adjusting transformers) and VAr output of generators. The remedial actions were obtained from the utility supplied data. It was observed that for such remedial actions, which did not change the system topology substantially, the order in which the two contingencies were processed did not have any significant effect on the results. Therefore, the total number of n-1-1 contingencies is 81003, ignoring the duplicate contingencies. In this sense, the proposed method could be extended to screen n-2 contingencies as well. However, for n-2 contingencies the ACLODFs are computed without performing any system adjustments. Table 1 lists the voltage and flow thresholds used for n-1 and n-1-1 contingency analysis. Any contingency violating these thresholds is considered as critical. GE-PSLF [14] was used to perform the power flow calculations. From the power flow analysis of the n-1 contingencies, 6 contingencies were found to violate the thresholds listed in Table 1. Table 2 lists the criteria used for screening the n-1-1 contingencies. Table 3 presents the results of the screening process. From Table 3 , it is observed that the screening process substantially reduces the number of cases that need to be analyzed in detail. It is worthwhile to mention that even with the moderate screening thresholds (see Table 2 ) used in this study, a significant reduction in the number of cases to be examined in detail, was achieved. As a recommendation, moderate screening thresholds should be chosen to begin with and these thresholds should be tightened/tuned over time to achieve better efficiency. ac power flows were performed for the 5549 screened cases to identify the contingencies that resulted in violations. The power flow study indicated that 3115 contingencies resulted in violations of voltage or flow or both thresholds. To check whether the contingency screening process is reliable, an exhaustive ac power flow based study was conducted for the 81003 contingencies. The exhaustive study identified the same 3115 contingencies reported in Table 3 as critical. It should be noted that the screening method captures a considerable number of noncritical contingences due to the moderate screening thresholds used in this work. The number of screened cases could be further reduced by tightening the screening thresholds mentioned in Table 2 . Although, using tight thresholds could result in possible omission of some critical contingencies. However, even moderate screening thresholds reduce the total number of contingencies to be analyzed to a manageable level. Table 3 also lists the number contingencies that lead to only voltage or only flow violations. It can be seen that for 38 contingencies no flow violations were observed although these outages led to severe voltage violations in parts of the system. The voltage violations were due to large voltage drops on lines, which served as the alternate transmission paths to the load area. However, the flows on these lines were well below their emergency ratings. This further illustrates that contingency screening based on ACLODF is able to identify cases where voltage violations may be an issue rather than flow violations. dc power flow based screening methods typically focus on detecting possible flow violations in the system.
Once the n-1-1 contingencies are screened and ac power flows are conducted for the screened cases, the bus voltages and the line flows are recorded. The contingencies are then ranked based on the indices given by (3) and (4) in [6] . Table 4 lists the choice of weights used for ranking the contingencies. As mentioned earlier a different weighting scheme can be used based on the operator/planner's experience. Table 5 lists the first three contingencies based on voltage based ranking and flow based ranking respectively. Ranking the contingencies enables an operator or a planner to identify the most severe outages in the system. Based on the information whether voltage violations or flow limit violation are of concern for these contingencies, corresponding measures can be taken to mitigate such violations.
E. ANALYSIS OF n-1-1 CONTINGENCIES WHERE POWER FLOW FAILS TO SOLVE
Since n-1-1 contingencies result in loss of two system components, such contingencies may lead to cases where the postcontingent power flow fails to solve. For the WECC case used here, the power flow fails to solve for 17 n-1-1 contingency cases. These contingencies can be examined by performing a dynamic study simulating the opening of the second line. Such a time domain simulation can be performed as follows. and 1217-1133 are marked with cross. When these two lines are disconnected, the loads in the region are supplied through 1143-1218-1121/1122 (marked with dotted line), which has a considerably higher impedance. The large voltage drop on the higher impedance path and lack of reactive power resources in the region leads to depressed voltages at the load buses. Fig. 3 shows the voltage at selected load buses in the region when the branches are disconnected. The power flow fails to solve for this case due of the abnormally low voltages in this area, resulting from the outage. Contingencies, that cause divergence in power flow solutions, lead to very high or very low voltages in parts of the system. Hence, these cases are critical from a static security perspective.
IV. n-1-1 CONTINGENCY SCREENING AND CLASSIFICATION FOR DSA
The contingency events referred to in this section are three-phase faults on lines followed by removal of the faulted lines from service by appropriate protection devices. Faults are large disturbances on the system and have significant impact on transient stability. DSA for n-1-1 contingencies VOLUME 3, NO. 2, JUNE 2016 is done in two steps. The first step is to simulate the initial contingency and check whether it is stable. If the system is stable and reaches an acceptable equilibrium after all automatic controls have acted, the second contingency is simulated. If the second contingency is stable and an acceptable steady state is reached, the n-1-1 contingency is labeled as secure. Otherwise, the n-1-1 contingency is labeled as insecure. As discussed earlier, one of the main challenges for n-1-1 contingency screening and classification is the large number of cases that need to be evaluated. As such, performing simplified fast calculations can become computationally prohibitive for realistic power systems. To alleviate the computational burden associated with n-1-1 contingency analysis, a two-stage approach is proposed here. In stage I, a subset of n-1-1 contingencies is screened for further classification. The screening process is based on the power flow results of the n-1 analysis. In stage II, the screened contingencies are classified based on kinetic energy gained due to a fault and the change in Thévenin's impedance (Z th ) at the point of interconnection (POI) of the affected generators in the post-fault network. Once the contingencies are screened and classified accordingly, detailed TDSs are conducted to check whether the contingencies may lead to dynamic security issues.
A. STAGE I: SCREENING OF n-1-1 CONTINGENCIES
The screening process is based on the power flow results of n-1 contingency analysis. The power flow solution after a contingency describes the post-disturbance equilibrium of the system, once all fast control actions have taken place. The impact of the second contingency on the system is dependent on this equilibrium point and hence the n-1 power flow solution is the starting point for the n-1-1 screening process. It should be noted that only stable n-1 contingencies are considered as the contingencies for the n-1-1 screening. This is a valid consideration as it is meaningless to analyze a successive contingency if the initial contingency is not stable. The screening process is similar to the screening process proposed for SSA in section III A. However, instead of ACLODF a new quantity MWLODF is used. The MWLODF is the percentage of MW flow in the outaged branch that shows up in all other branches in the system. As an example, the MWLODF in a hypothetical line A for outage of line B is computed as follows:
To generate the list of screened n-1-1 contingencies involving branch-branch outages, steps 1 to 7 excluding steps 3 and 6 as given in section III A are performed. Steps 3 and 6 are excluded in this screening process as overloading of lines is a steady state issue and does not impact dynamic security assessment. Since system stability is of concern, change in the MW flow is a suitable screening parameter as it influences the rotor angles of the generators in a system. A higher value of MWLODF indicates that only a few branches compensate for the lost flow on the disconnected branch. This implies that the branch may be closer to a generation source or a load center where the network is vulnerable. A fault on a line with a high MWLODF can be critical as the disturbance may be close to a generator or group of generators. Subsequent disconnection of the line to clear the fault can result in a weak post-disturbance network due to loss of a main transmission path. A lower value of the MWLODF indicates that only a small fraction of the lost flow on the disconnected line shows up in other lines. Faults at such locations followed by removal of the line do not weaken the transmission system significantly. It is worthwhile to mention that a higher value of the MWLODF does imply that a fault on the corresponding line will be more severe than on others. However, it is a good measure to identify critical lines where faults could be possibly severe. The screening process is conservative in the sense that not all screened cases are unstable. It should be noted that stability assessment is not an issue here. The screening and classification process aims to prioritize the analysis of cases, which are critical from a stability assessment viewpoint. The n-1-1 contingencies eliminated by the screening process are categorized as least critical (LCR) for stability assessment.
B. STAGE II: CLASSIFICATION OF SCREENED n-1-1 CONTINGENCIES
Stage II deals with classifying the screened n-1-1 contingencies obtained from stage I. The screened contingencies are classified based on two factors:
1. total kinetic energy gained by the machines due to the applied fault, and 2. the maximum change in Z th seen at the POI of a generator or a group of generators affected by the fault due to removal of the faulted line from service It is assumed that a fault applied on the system will be cleared in 5 cycles, which is a standard clearing time for modern circuit breakers rated for 100kV and above [23] . This clearing time can be suitably adjusted for specific cases without loss of generality. Based on the two measurements the screened contingencies are categorized as critical (CR), possibly critical (PCR) and non-critical (NCR). The following steps are followed to classify the screened contingencies.
1. Solve the power flow by removing the first line considered in the n-1 contingency. 2. Perform a time domain simulation and apply a 5-cycle three-phase fault on the screened second line considered in the n-1-1 case. The time domain simulation is run only until the fault is cleared. 3. Record the angular speed of generators in the area of study at the end of the fault and compute the total kinetic energy gained by the system with respect to the center of inertia (COI) [25] of the area of interest. The total kinetic energy gained during the fault is given by
where ω coi is the angular velocity of the center of inertia ω i is the angular velocity of the ith generator M i is the inertia constant of the ith generator KE is the kinetic energy gained by the system J i is the moment of inertia of the ith generator 4. Remove the faulted line from service and compute the change in Z th as seen at the POIs of all generators/group of generators in the region of interest. 5. Record the maximum change in Z th and the corresponding bus number of the POI where it occurs. The maximum change in Z th will be referred to as Z thmax . The stability of a power system during a fault depends on the kinetic energy gained by the system due to the fault and the robustness of the post-disturbance network to absorb [24] . This can be understood by examining the equal area criterion for a one-machine infinite bus system. The idea has been extended to multi-machine systems as well [25] . During a fault, the ability of the network to export electrical power is severely restricted causing the machine to accelerate. Once the fault is cleared by opening the faulted line, the machine is able to export electrical power and it decelerates. The stability of the machine is dependent on its ability to decelerate in the post-disturbance condition and reach a steady state. The kinetic energy gained by the system during a fault is computed by performing a short time domain simulation with a three-phase fault applied on the concerned branch. To estimate the ability of the system to decelerate, the change in Z th seen into the system at the POI of the generator due to opening of the faulted line is computed. The buses, which are the POI of generating stations, are typically known to planners beforehand. The change in Z th can be computed by using sparsity oriented compensation methods [26] . A review of the swing equation [24] indicates that a large change in Z th results in a substantial reduction in the peak of the postfault swing curve as compared to the pre-faulted condition. A reduction in the peak of the post-fault swing curve limits the ability of the generator to decelerate, thereby making it prone to instability. Hence, these two factors are chosen to categorize contingencies based on their impact on stability.
Based on the computed quantities the contingencies are categorized into three distinct categories. Brief descriptions of the three different categories are as follows I. Critical (CR): A Contingency is categorized as CR if both the kinetic energy and the Z thmax due to the contingency are high. A critical contingency implies that the fault is electrically close to a generator and opening of the faulted line weakens the transmission system. Such cases are likely to have stability issues and warrant detailed time domain analysis. II. Possibly Critical (PCR): A Contingency that results in large kinetic energy and small Z thmax or small kinetic energy and large Z thmax is categorized as PCR. A large kinetic energy and small Z thmax implies that although the fault is close to generation units, the post disturbance network is strong. On the other hand, a large Z thmax and small kinetic energy indicates that although the post-fault network is weak, the fault is electrically distant from large generation units. Contingencies categorized as PCR may not be unstable under a given operating condition, but can become critical as the operating conditions change. III. Non Critical (NCR): Contingencies that result in both small kinetic energy and small Z thmax are categorized as NCR. No detailed time domain analysis is required for these contingencies. Once the contingencies are categorized as CR, PCR and NCR, they can be displayed on a kinetic energy vs. Z thmax plot for ease of visualization. The visualization approach is helpful as it enables a planner/operator to estimate the relative severity of the contingencies. Fig. 4 shows the three regions on the kinetic energy vs. Z thmax plot. It should be noted that the boundaries of the three different regions are system dependent and hence, not defined explicitly. These boundaries can be defined ad hoc for a particular system and subsequently tuned over time to increase the efficiency of the classification process. The lack of an explicit definition of the boundaries does not negate the classification process, as this process does not judge whether a contingency is unstable. Rather, the classification process categorizes the contingencies based on their relative severity. A comprehensive stability assessment is performed via TDS, which is a more reliable method. The cases marked as CR and PCR should be assessed by detailed TDS. Cases marked as NCR and LCR can be assessed by early termination TDS [27] , which is faster. The contingencies should be assessed in the order CR and PCR followed by NCR and LCR. 
C. n-1-1 CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR DYNAMIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT
MATLAB and GE PSLF [13] were used to perform the n-1-1 contingency classification. As mentioned in Section III-B, a 5-cycle three-phase fault was considered as the disturbance on the system. An n-1 contingency analysis was performed for DSA before proceeding to the n-1-1 analysis. 13 n-1 contingencies lead to islanding of generation units and all other contingencies were stable. The 13 contingencies were excluded as the first contingency for the n-1-1 analysis.
The screening process described in stage I of the proposed method was used to screen candidate lines for simulating the second outage. The MWLODF threshold for screening candidate lines for second outage was set to 40%. Lowering the MWLODF threshold did not result in screening of any additional unstable contingency. Hence, the set threshold was considered sufficient for the screening process. After the second set of candidate lines are screened, a list of n-1-1 contingencies is created. The screened n-1-1 contingencies are then classified appropriately by the classification process described in stage II of the proposed method. Table 6 lists the number of all possible n-1-1 contingencies and the number of screened contingencies. The screening process substantially reduces the number of cases to be classified. As indicated earlier the screening process of stage I is a conservative in nature. Not all screened contingencies are likely to have dynamic issues. However, the screening process eliminates all the n-1-1 contingencies that are least critical from a transient stability perspective. Fig. 5 shows the location of the screened n-1-1 contingencies on the kinetic energy vs. Z thmax plot. The three different categories of contingencies are marked distinctly on the plot. Table 7 lists the number of n-1-1 contingencies in the four different categories. TDS were performed for the 204 screened n-1-1 contingencies. All the contingencies in the categories PCR and NCR were found to be stable. The 3 contingencies categorized as CR were found to cause instability. Table 8 presents the results of TDS for 8 selected contingencies in categories CR and PCR. The 8 selected contingencies (otg1-otg8) are marked in Fig. 5 . The 8 contingencies were chosen the cover the CR cases and the PCR cases, which resulted in high kinetic energy or high Z thmax . The contingencies in the region PCR are stable at this operating condition. This is because in these cases either the fault is far from large generation or the post-disturbance network is strong enough to provide adequate deceleration to the accelerating generators.
It is worthwhile to examine the contingencies categorized as PCR in further detail. As mentioned earlier, these contingencies could become critical due change in operating conditions. An example to illustrate such a case is as follows:
Case: otg8 -outage of the lines 1518-1519 and 1211-1212 Outage of line 1518-1519 is considered as the n-1 outage. A 5-cycle three-phase fault on line 1211-1212 and the ensuing outage is considered as the n-1-1 event. Fig. 6 shows a schematic one-line diagram of the area of interest. From  Fig. 5 , it can be seen that the contingency otg8 results in a large Z thmax , though the kinetic energy gained is comparatively less. Z thmax for this contingency was recorded at bus 1212, which is the POI of 12 generators CTG1 to CTG 12, each rated at 44 MW. In the present scenario, only 4 generators are switched on producing 140 MW. Since the machines are smaller and have low inertia, the total kinetic energy gained by the machines is not significantly high. Opening the considered lines (marked crosses in Fig. 6 ) due to the sequential outages, results in a large Z thmax . This is due to the high impedance of the path 1212-1518-1160 (marked with dotted line), through which the generation is connected to the rest of the system in the post-fault condition. As listed in Table 8 , the contingency is stable for this operating scenario.
The total generation capability at bus 1212 is 528 MW (12 units, 44 MW each). As such, the generation level may be increased under heavy load periods or due to the loss of generation at some other location in the system. Fig. 7 shows the trace of the otg8 on the kinetic energy vs. Z thmax plot as the generation at 1212 is increased. Fig. 7 shows that as the generation increases, the contingency leaves the PCR region and moves towards the CR region. This is because the added generators contribute to the kinetic energy. At a total output of 510 MW at bus 1212, with 12 units online, otg8 results in both high kinetic energy and Zthmax. At this operating condition, otg8 is in the CR region and needs to be analyzed by detailed TDS. Table 9 list the results of the TDS performed for otg8 for five different generation levels at 1212.
From Table 9 it can be seen that otg8 leads to instability when the generation at 1212 is increased. 
V. PROCESSING TIME
The processing time for the proposed n-1-1 analysis for both SSA and DSA is presented in Table 10 . The methods were implemented on an Intel Core i7-3770 @ 3.40 GHz processor with a 16 GB RAM.
The following comments are in order. 1.
Step 1 needs to be performed first before proceeding to the other steps.
Step 1 is parallelizable if parallel computing capability is available. 2.
Step 2 is performed to generate the contingency list for both SSA and DSA. 3.
Step 3 and Step 4 are independent of each other and can be done separately in any order. 4.
Step 3 is parallelizable if parallel computing capability is available. 5.
Step 4a and Step 4b are independent of each other and can be done separately in any order. Both step 4a and 4b are parallelizable. The timings presented in Table 10 are considering sequential processing due to the unavailability of parallel computing. However, using the newer versions of PSLF [28] , which have high performance computing (HPC) module [28] a substantial reduction in the processing time is possible. It should be noted that the methods discussed here are proposed for n-1-1 analysis in the operations planning phase. Hence, the timings achieved in the presented report were sufficient for the intended purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a systematic approach to n-1-1 contingency analysis for a realistic large power system. An n-1-1 contingency screening and ranking method was proposed for SSA and an n-1-1 contingency screening and classification method was proposed for DSA. The main merit of these methods lies in the ease of implementation and the ability to screen critical contingencies reliably with reduced computational effort. The screening methods limit the number of contingencies for which detailed analysis needs to be performed. Ranking of the screened contingencies allows the operator/planner to identify the most severe contingencies and devise corresponding corrective measures from a steady state perspective. Classification of contingencies from a stability viewpoint enables an operator to identify contingencies, VOLUME 3, NO. 2, JUNE 2016 which are unstable or may become unstable under changing grid conditions. The accuracy of the proposed methods was verified by a comparing the results with an exhaustive n-1-1 power flow analysis and n-1-1 TDS results.
The methods presented in this paper provide an approach to identify the potentially harmful contingencies quickly and reliably from the large number of possible contingencies. In future work, the methods need to be implemented using parallel computing infrastructure to identify the potential savings in processing time. Furthermore, the proposed methods need to be tested on more actual power system cases, which will evaluate the efficiency of the methods.
